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Error Correction and the
Supreme Court's Arbitration Docket
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL*
Supreme Court Justices from William Taft to Stephen Breyer have
repeated the maxim that the "Supreme Court is not a court of error
correction." When it comes to arbitration law, however, a number of the
Court's cases do little more than correct errors by lower courts. So why has
error correction played such a significant role in the Court's arbitration
docket? One important factor is ongoing resistance to the Court's arbitration
decisions in the lower courts, to which a number of the Court's error
correcting decisions are a direct response. Another is that cases involving
standards rather than rules necessarily require fact-based determinations,
and the nature of the Court's case selection process can result in the Court
reviewing cases with one-sided facts that make little law. But, in addition,
the generalist legal background of Supreme Court Justices (and their law
clerks) leads them to overlook important nuances in the facts of arbitration
cases before the Court on certiorari. These nuances give rise to several
simple steps the Court could take to avoid some of its more limited
decisions, including: (1) reviewing state court cases only when the issue
presented does not also arise in cases in federal courts; (2) avoiding cases
arising out of post-dispute arbitration agreements; and (3) choosing cases
with typical arbitration clauses, not atypical ones.
Supreme Court Justices from William Taft through Stephen Breyer have
repeated the maxim that "[t]he United States Supreme Court is not a court of
error correction."' What they mean is that "[t]he function of the Supreme
Court is conceived to be, not the remedying of a particular litigant's wrong,
but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the
application of which are of wide public or governmental interest."2 Indeed, a
common basis for arguing against the Court's grant of certiorari is that the
* John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty
Development, University of Kansas School of Law. This article is a revised and
expanded version of my Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution, presented at the Ohio
State University, Moritz College of Law on March 28, 2013. I appreciate helpful
comments from Sarah Cole, Ellen Deason, Catherine Rogers, Nancy Rogers, Bo
Rutledge, and Steve Ware, and the research assistance of Jean Mdnager and Richard Shie.
I Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the
Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006); see William Howard Taft, The
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act ofFebruary 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2
(1925).
2 Taft, supra note 1, at 2.
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case should not be reviewed because it is "factbound"-i.e., dependent on
the application of settled law to the particular facts of the case and not likely
to result in a decision of widespread importance. 3
When it comes to arbitration law,4 however, a number of the Court's
cases turn out to be narrow decisions that do little more than correct errors by
lower courts.5 The relatively large number of summary reversals in
arbitration cases is the clearest illustration. 6 In addition, however, a number
of other Supreme Court arbitration cases in recent years have involved highly
fact-specific decisions that either might have had, or in fact did have, little
effect beyond the case itself. And some decisions that did have broader effect
were actually-according to subsequent Supreme Court decisions-based on
unusual facts and should not have been applied so broadly. Of course, not all
arbitration cases have such limited reach. Some, such as AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, have been applied widely by the lower courts.7 But even
Concepcion could have been limited to its facts-and some courts (albeit
only a very small minority) in fact did so.8
So why has error correction played such a significant role in the Court's
arbitration docket? Certainly an important factor is ongoing resistance to the
3 See infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
4 This article focuses on cases decided under the Federal Arbitration Act rather than
cases involving arbitration between labor unions and management.
5 For one definition of error correction, see Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the
Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 278-79 (2006) ("Error correction implies reversing lower
court judgments simply because they are wrong. It implies supervising the outcomes of
individual cases to ensure that the lower courts are always stating and applying the law
correctly.").
6 See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.
7 PUBLIC CITIZEN & NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, JUSTICE
DENIED: ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S
CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (2012), available at http://www.citizen.
org/documents/concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf ("identiflying] Seventy-
six potential class action cases where judges cited Concepcion and held that class action
bans within arbitration clauses were enforceable.").
8 E.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 652, at *10 (Mass. Super. Oct. 4, 2011)
(distinguishing Concepcion on ground that unlike the AT&T Mobility clause, "[t]he Dell
Arbitration Clause provides no incentives and simply requires arbitration of all disputes,
even those that could not possibly justify the expense in light of the amount in
controversy"), rev'd on other grounds, 993 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst
& Young LLP, 847 F. Supp. 2d 528, 536 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (distinguishing
Concepcion on the ground the Court there "emphasized in detail the provisions in that
arbitration agreement that benefitted plaintiffs and that ensured that the Concepcions
would be able to find redress for their claims"), rev'd, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Court's arbitration decisions in the lower courts. In the face of such
resistance, the Court may give greater weight to correcting lower courts that
refuse to follow its decisions. In addition, cases involving standards rather
than rules necessarily require fact-based determinations, and the nature of the
Court's case selection process can result in the Court reviewing cases with
one-sided facts that end up making little law.
But in addition, another factor is the generalist legal background of
Supreme Court Justices (and their law clerks), which leads them to overlook
important nuances in the facts of arbitration cases on certiorari. These
nuances give rise to several suggestions that might avoid some of the Court's
more limited or problematic decisions, including: (1) reviewing state court
cases only when the issue presented does not also arise in cases in federal
courts; (2) avoiding cases arising out of post-dispute arbitration agreements;
and (3) choosing cases with typical arbitration clauses, not atypical ones.
I want to emphasize several caveats to my argument: first, I am not
suggesting that all or even most Supreme Court arbitration cases involve only
error correction. Instead, my argument is simply that a surprising-to me, at
least-number of its arbitration cases can be so viewed. Second, the sample
of Supreme Court arbitration cases is a small one, such that the cases I am
considering may be random anomalies rather than reflecting systematic
patterns. Third, the Court takes cases as presented to it by the parties,9 so
some of what I observe results from case selection by parties rather than the
Court. Finally, arbitration law is by no means the only field in which
commentators have noted a significant degree of error correction in the
Court's cases.10 To be clear, I am not suggesting that arbitration law is
unique in this regard."
9 See Maxwell Mak et al., Is Certiorari Contingent on Litigant Behavior?
Petitioners' Role in Strategic Auditing, 10 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 54, 55 (2013) ("[W]e
show that the decision to grant [certiorari] ... is conditional on the choices litigants make
in deciding to petition for review.").
10 E.g., Douglas A. Berman, Initial Reflections on an Error-Correction SCOTUS
Term, SENTENCING LAW & POL'Y BLOG (June 30, 2006), http://sentencing.typepad.
com/sentencinglaw and policy/2006/06/initial reflect.html (citing "the reality that the
Roberts Court assumed an 'error-correction' role in its approach to criminal justice
matters. Notably, this term the Court had a large number of per curium reversals in
criminal cases, and even many decisions rendered after full argument were often focused
principally on making sure lower courts understood what they did wrong.").
11 Indeed, to do so I would need to compare arbitration cases to other types of cases
decided by the Court, which I do not do in this article.
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My argument here is related to, but distinct from, the theory of "oddball"
or "atypical" cases proposed by Suja Thomas.12 Thomas argues that the
Supreme Court "should not make legal change motivated by atypical or
oddball facts when the change will affect typical cases."1 3 Rick Bales and
Mark Gerano have applied the concept to arbitration cases, citing AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant as examples of "oddball" cases. 14 Like Thomas and Bales, I
highlight the atypical, unusual facts of some recent Supreme Court cases.
And I readily recognize that not all cases with atypical facts are applied
narrowly (although I question whether decisions like Concepcion are
"motivated" by the atypical facts of the case as Bales and Gerano suggest).
But my emphasis here differs from theirs because I focus on atypical cases
that tend to be "easy" rather than "hard," and thus have little impact beyond
their facts.
My approach also differs from theirs in that it is largely a positive one
rather than a normative one. I am not evaluating whether the Court's
approach to selecting arbitration cases is the proper one, or whether the
outcomes of the cases that result are good or bad. Instead, the question I
address here is whether the Court is doing what it says it is doing, and if not,
why not (although I do offer some suggestions for how the Court might
correct some of the occasional mistakes I think it has made in selecting
cases).
Part I of this article provides an overview of the Supreme Court and error
correction. Part II analyzes error correction in the Supreme Court's
arbitration cases. Part III then identifies possible explanations for the
frequency of error correction in the Supreme Court's arbitration docket.
12 Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack
of Judicial Restraint in Twombly, Wal-Mart, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013). My argument here is also distinct from Cass Sunstein's theory of
judicial minimalism, although not necessarily inconsistent with it. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1999)
(explaining that "the practice of minimalism involves two principle features, narrowness
and shallowness"). A decision that only corrects lower court errors would likely be a
"narrow" decision-it decides the case rather than establishing a broad rule-and a
"shallow" one-it "avoid[s] issues of basic principal"-as Sunstein uses the terms. Id. at
17-18.
13 Thomas, supra note 12 (manuscript at 5).
14 Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Oddball Arbitration, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 18-32) (citing 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, a
labor arbitration case, as another example).
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I. ERROR CORRECTION BY THE SUPREME COURT
At the urging of Chief Justice Taft, and to reduce a large backlog of
cases in the Supreme Court, Congress in 1925 enacted the so-called "Judges'
Bill,"' 5 which gave the Court substantial control over its docket.16 The
United States Courts of Appeals had been created thirty some years
previously,17 and so an important argument in favor of the Judges' Bill was
that the Supreme Court was no longer needed for error correction. The
Courts of Appeals played that role, permitting the Supreme Court to focus on
issues of concern beyond the parties to the case. As Chief Justice Taft
explained in his testimony in support of the bill:
No litigant is entitled to more than two chances, namely, to
the original trial and to a review, and the intermediate courts of
review are provided for that purpose. When a case goes beyond that,
it is not primarily to preserve the rights of the litigants. The Supreme
Court's function is for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing
principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing
upon constitutional questions and other important questions of law
for the public benefit. It is to preserve uniformity of decision among
the intermediate courts of appeal.18
In law review commentary on the bill once passed, Taft wrote: "[t]he
function of the Supreme Court is conceived to be, not the remedying of a
particular litigant's wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision
involves principles, the application of which are of wide public or
governmental interest."l 9 In other words, after enactment of the Judges' Bill,
error correction was no longer a central function of the Supreme Court.
15 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. The bill was called the "Judges' Bill"
because it had been drafted by Supreme Court Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, and
Sutherland. See Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (1986).
16 For a detailed discussion of the history of the Judges' Bill, see Edward A.
Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges'
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1660-704 (2000).
17 Id. at 1650.
18 Hearings on H.R. 10479 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (Mar. 30, 1922) (statement of Chief Justice Taft).
19 Taft, supra note 1, at 2; see also Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163
(1923) (Taft, C.J.) ("The jurisdiction [to review decisions of the Courts of Appeals] was
5
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Since Chief Justice Taft, numerous other Justices have reiterated the
same point: that the Court is not in the business of error correction. 20 Rather,
the Court seeks to decide legal issues of broad public importance:
* Chief Justice Vinson: "The Supreme Court is not, and never has
been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court
decisions." 21
* Justice Harlan: "The fact that a case may have been wrongly decided
as between the parties is not, standing alone, enough to assure certiorari. Nor,
for that matter, is the fact that a case may have been rightly decided in itself
enough to preclude certiorari." 22
* Chief Justice Rehnquist: "Rather than serving as an appellate court
that simply attempts to correct errors in cases involving no generally
important principle of law, the Court instead tries to pick those cases
involving unsettled questions of federal constitutional or statutory law of
general interest." 23
* Justice Breyer: "The United States Supreme Court is not a court of
error correction." 24
* Justice Scalia: "[I]t's not the job of the Supreme Court of the United
States to correct the states .. . Error correction-unless it's a capital case-is
not what we do." 25
not conferred upon this court merely to give the defeated party in the Circuit Court of
Appeals another hearing.").
20 But see Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice John Paul Stevens: Teaching by
Example, 44 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 819 (2011) ("It is often said that the U.S. Supreme
Court is not a court of error correction. But that is not entirely true, and Justice Stevens
had a particular instinct for identifying those errors that warranted further review even
absent a circuit split, a large amount in controversy, or the involvement of a public
figure.").
21 Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address Before
the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949).
2 2 JoiN M. HARLAN, MANNING THE DIKES: SOME COMMENTS ON THE STATUTORY
CERTIORARI JURISDICTION AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1958).
23 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Lecture at the Faculty of Law of the
University of Guanajuato, Mexico (Sept. 27, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp 09-27-01.html).
24 Breyer, supra note 1, at 92.
25 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Addresses ABA Midyear Meeting in
New Orleans, ABANow (Feb. 4, 2012) (quoting Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/u s
supreme courtj.html/.
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The principle is also reflected in the Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure.
Rule 10 describes a number of "compelling reasons" for granting certiorari;
error correction is not among them.26 To the contrary, the rule expressly
states that "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law."2 7
As such, a common ground for arguing against the grant of certiorari is
that the case is "factbound"-i.e., that it involves the application of settled
law to the (possibly unusual) facts of the case. 28 One recent (and ultimately
unsuccessful) example of such an argument is the Solicitor General's brief in
BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina.29 The issue in BG Group is
whether a court or the arbitrator decides if a pre-condition to arbitration-in
that case, whether a litigation requirement imposed by the applicable bilateral
investment treaty-has been met. The SG recommended against cert, arguing
that the decision turned on application of settled law to the unusual factual
setting of the case:
The court's case-specific conclusions do not conflict with any decision
of this Court or another court of appeals. The decision is unlikely to have
any significant impact beyond this case because the Treaty's litigation
requirement does not have analogues in any modem treaties or other
investment agreements to which the United States is a party, and it appears
to be uncommon in international treaty practice. For similar reasons, this
case would also be an unsuitable vehicle for establishing general principles
governing the interpretation of more typical international or domestic
arbitration agreements. Further review is not warranted. 30
26 Sup. Ct. R. 10; see EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 351
(9th ed. 2007).
27 Sup. Ct. R. 10.
28 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as
Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 941 (2009) ("Cases in which a
party is asking the Court to review a lower court's application of specific facts to a settled
legal principle are 'factbound."'); see Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 12 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 460 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) ("In sum, this is a notably fact-bound case in which the Court of Appeals
unquestionably stated the correct rule of law. It is thus 'the type of case in which we are
most inclined to deny certiorari."').
29 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, BG Group PLC v. Republic of
Argentina, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013) (No. 12-138).
30 Id at 8-9.
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The Court ultimately granted certiorari in the case, declining to follow
the Solicitor General's recommendation. 31 My point here is not that the
Court should have followed the SG's recommendation, but rather to illustrate
how parties oppose review by the Court on the ground that any decision by
the Court will not establish a general principle of law-that is, will be no
more than error correction. Of course, in those cases in which the Supreme
Court reverses the judgment under review it necessarily is correcting an error
by the lower court. And the fact that the Court reverses in the substantial
majority of cases it decides (reversing in 68.2% of cases decided after
argument during the last three terms32) suggests that error correction does in
fact play a role in the Court's decision making: when resolving legal issues
of broad importance it also corrects errors. 33 In such cases, error correction is
a by-product of resolving the legal issues (perhaps even a by-product sought
by the Justices). But it is not the purpose for the Court's review of the case.
As the leading Supreme Court commentary states: "[e]rror correction . .. is
outside the mainstream of the Court's functions." 34
II. ERROR CORRECTION IN SUPREME COURT ARBITRATION CASES
Despite the Justices' repeated statements that the Court is not in the
business of correcting lower court errors, its arbitration docket nonetheless
reflects a significant degree of error correction. A recent rash of summary
31 BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
32 From O.T. 2010 through O.T. 2012, the Court reversed in 161 of 236 cases, or
68.2% of the time. See Stat Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 27,
2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SCOTUSblogStatPack
_OTI2.pdf (reversing in 56 of 78 cases); Stat Pack for October Term 2011,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Sept. 25, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblogStat Pack OTI 1_Updatedl.pdf (reversing in 48
of 76 cases); Stat Pack for October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 28, 2011),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SBOTI Ostatpack
final.pdf (reversing in 57 of 82 cases).
33 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 239 ("In the context of such a nationally
important case, perceived 'error' in the lower court's resolution of an important issue
does indeed become relevant for certiorari purposes."). Indeed, if error correction were
irrelevant to the Court, one might expect that it would affirm and reverse in roughly equal
proportions (subject to selection bias issues). See Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda Setting in
Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 889,
905 (2004) ("[T]he fact that a statistically significant correlation exists between the
Justices' decision to grant certiorari and their decision to reverse on the merits, suggests
the Court is far more result oriented than many scholars seem to believe.").
34 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 351.
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reversals in arbitration cases provides a clear illustration. In addition, several
of its arbitration cases have been largely limited to their facts or else were
initially applied broadly only to be reined in by later decisions of the Court.
And even some of the more controversial recent arbitration decisions might
have been limited to their facts, although only few courts have done so.
I do not claim that all or even most of the Supreme Court's arbitration
docket amounts only to error correction. Such a claim would be overbroad.
Nor do I contend that the Supreme Court is more likely to engage in error
correction in arbitration cases than in the rest of its docket. To make such a
claim would require comparing the frequency of error correction in
arbitration cases to the frequency of error correction in other cases, which I
have not sought to do. Indeed, commentators have noticed a significant
degree of error correction in the Court's habeas and criminal docket,
suggesting arbitration cases are not unique.35 Instead, my point is narrower:
that a number of Supreme Court arbitration cases either have been or might
have been limited to their relatively unusual facts. In many of those cases, the
Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, seems to be doing little more
than correcting errors in lower court decisions.
A. Summary Reversals
The clearest evidence of error correction in Supreme Court arbitration
cases (or any Supreme Court cases, for that matter) is summary reversals.36
Summary reversal "is a rare and exceptional disposition, usually reserved by
th[e] Court for situations in which the law is well settled and stable, the facts
are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error." 37 Given these
35 Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, Accelerating Pace of Supreme Court's Summary
Reversals of Habeas Relief Suggests Impatience with Circuit Court's Failure to Defer to
State Tribunals, CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1, 4 (Jun. 27, 2012) ("Indeed, during the Roberts
era, the number of summary reversals based on this issue [federal court deference to state
courts in habeas cases] far outstrips those issued on any other ground. It's not even
close.").
36 Rule 16.1 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after considering the petition
for certiorari and other filings, "the Court will enter an appropriate order," which "may be
a summary disposition on the merits." Sup. Ct. R. 16.1. When the Court summarily
reverses the judgment below, it does so without full briefing and argument on the merits,
usually by issuing a short, per curiam opinion.
37 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 15 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 350) (internal quotations omitted); see Scorr L.
NELSON, OPPOSING CERT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 5 (2009), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/OpposingCertGuide.pdf ("Summary reversal is the
dispositional equivalent of the atom bomb. It occurs when at least five members of the
9
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circumstances in which the Court will reverse summarily, "[e]rror correction
... appears to be the only legitimate function of summary reversals." 38
Table 1 summarizes the number of opinions in argued cases and
summary reversals by term (in column two), and then identifies the Court's
arbitration cases by term (in column three). The data show some increase in
summary reversals under Chief Justice Roberts (from 5.4 per term for the
five terms immediately prior to his confirmation to 7 per term for the eight
terms since). 39 More notable for my purposes, however, although concededly
a small sample, is that almost one-fifth of the Court's summary reversals in
O.T. 2011 and O.T. 2012 (3 of 16) involved arbitration matters. Indeed, since
O.T. 2000, the proportion of summary reversals that addressed arbitration
issues (4 of 83, or 4.8%) is more than double the proportion of argued cases
(18 of 948, or 1.9%) that addressed arbitration issues.
Table 1. Supreme Court Arbitration Docket from OT 2000 to OT 2012
Term Total Opinions 41
Argued/Per Curiam40  Federal Arbitration Act Cases
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.
OT 2012 73/5 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter
Nitro-Lifi Techs., LLC v. Howard
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood
OT 2011 65/11 Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi
OT 2010 77/5 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion
Court believe, based solely on the petition, the response, and the reply in support of the
petition (together with any amicus briefs that may have been filed at the certiorari stage),
that the decision below is so obviously incorrect that the case does not require briefing
and oral argument.").
38 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 351.
39 The number of summary reversals has declined substantially from 1971-1976,
when the Court issued an average of 25 summary reversals per term, and even from
1977-1979, when the average was 18 per term. Id. at 350 n.106.
Stat Packfor October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG 10 (June 27, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/SCOTUSbiog_StatPackOT12.
pdf. In Table 1, summary reversals are in italics.
4' For a mostly complete list of the Supreme Court's arbitration cases, including
labor arbitration cases, see Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 643, 684 app. B (2012) (complete list except for omission of
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi).
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OT 2009 72/14 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.Rent-A-Ctr. W, Inc. v. Jackson
OT 2008 75/4 Vaden v. Discover BankArthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle
OT 2007 69/2 Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc.Preston v. Ferrer
OT 2006 68/4
OT 2005 71/11 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
OT 2004 76/4
OT 2003 74/5
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle
OT 2002 73/7 Howsam v. Dean Witter ReynoldsPacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.
OT 2001 76/5 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
C&L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
OT 2000 79/6 TribeGreen Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph
Circuit City Stores v. Adams
Total 948/83 18 opinions in argued cases4 per curiam summary reversals
In all of the summary reversals, the lower court decisions clearly
misapplied the FAA. The Oklahoma decision in Nitro-Lift Technologies,
LLC v. Howard was flatly contrary to Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, in which the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator, rather than a
court, is to decide whether the main contract (i.e., the contract that includes
the arbitration clause) is illegal. The cases differed only in the type of illegal
provision involved-a covenant not to compete in Nitro-Lift as compared to
an allegedly usurious interest rate in Buckeye. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown had created
an exception to the FAA that was nowhere in the text of the statute and that
wholly lacked support in any prior Supreme Court precedent. The Alabama
Supreme Court's holding in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco-that the FAA did not
apply to an interstate loan refinancing transaction-essentially was a holding
that Congress lacked the power to regulate such a transaction, which clearly
was incorrect. The weakest case for summary reversal was KPMG LLP v.
Cocchi. The Supreme Court has long held that a court must compel
arbitration of claims within the scope of an arbitration agreement even if the
case also includes nonarbitrable claims, which the Florida court failed to do.
11
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The Florida decision was certainly wrong, but from the opinions it seems
more like inadvertence on the part of the court than anything else.
The summary reversals were all in cases that originated in state rather
than federal courts, and often included some suggestion that the state court
disagreed with Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA. The West
Virginia court in Marmet Health was the most blatant, observing that:
It is apparent that Congress intended for the FAA to serve only as a
procedural statute for disputes brought in the federal courts. Congress also
intended the Act to govern only contracts between merchants with relatively
equal bargaining power who voluntarily entered arbitration agreements....
... With tendentious reasoning, the United States Supreme Court has
stretched the application of the FAA from being a procedural statutory
scheme effective only in the federal courts, to being a substantive law that
preempts state law in both the federal and state courts.
Further, the Supreme Court has created from whole cloth the doctrine
of "severability," found in a line of cases under the FAA bearing on who
decides the validity of an arbitration agreement ... 42
All of these statements are direct attacks on the reasoning of Supreme Court
arbitration decisions, some of which, such as the separability doctrine, had
nothing to do with the case itself.
Alafabco and Nitro-Lift contained similar, albeit more subtle, indications
of resistance to the Supreme Court's arbitration rulings. Alafabco was one of
a series of decisions in which the Alabama Supreme Court sought to avoid
application of the FAA by construing its scope narrowly. The Court reversed
one such decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson.43 But even
after Allied-Bruce, the Alabama court continued to construe the scope of the
FAA narrowly,44 eventually resulting in the summary reversal in Alafabco.45
In Nitro-Lift, by comparison, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on a prior
42 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278-79 (W. Va. 2011), rev'd
sub nom. Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per
curiam).
43 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
4 See, e.g., Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 736 So. 2d 582, 586-87 (Ala.
1999); Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759, 765-67 (Ala.
2000); American Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Morton, 812 So. 2d 282, 288-90 (Ala. 2001); F.A.
Dobbs & Sons, Inc. v. Northcutt, 819 So. 2d 607, 611 (Ala. 2001).
45 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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decision in which it construed the scope of the FAA narrowly,46 and
concluded that a specific state statute (here making covenants not to compete
invalid) "must govern over the more general statute favoring
arbitration" 47-either misconstruing or ignoring FAA preemption. Again,
Cocchi is the exception. Although at least one commentator subsequently
suggested that the Florida Court was expressing disagreement with Supreme
Court precedent, 48 the case lacks the same direct or indirect evidence of
resistance.
In all three of the summary reversals from O.T. 2011 and O.T. 2012, the
respondent suggested in its cert petition that the Court summarily reverse the
decision below,49 and in two of the cases, the petitioner was represented by
experienced Supreme Court counsel,50 which might have given the Court
46 Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC, 273 P.3d 20, 26 (Okla. 2011) (relying on
Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship, 155 P.3d 16, 31-32 (Okla. 2006) (which held
that the FAA does not apply to arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts), in which
"[t]he Supreme Court decisions discussed therein, and relied upon by Nitro-Lift here,
were found not to inhibit our review of the underlying contract's validity"), rev'd, 133 S
Ct. 500 (2012).
47 Id. at 26 n.21.
48 Michael J. Hassen, Class Action Defense Cases-KPMG v. Cocchi: Supreme
Court Reiterates Requirement that State Courts Follow Concepcion and Enforce
Arbitration Agreements Under The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), CLASS ACTION
DEFENSE BLOG (2011), http://classactiondefense.jmbm.com/201 1/1 1/class action
defensecaseskpmg.html ("Despite its April 27, 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, some state courts have continued to find 'creative' ways to avoid its
mandate. The Florida state courts, however, failed to follow these rules.").
49 Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 23, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011) (No. 10-
1521) ("Although summary reversal is strong medicine, it is appropriate where, as here,
the law is well settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is
clearly in error.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 21,
Clarksburg Nursing Home & Rehab. Center, LLC v. Marchio, 132 S. Ct. 1619 (2011)
(No. 11-394) ("The Court may wish to consider summary reversal on account of the West
Virginia court's 'obvious' error in failing to follow the 'straightforward' analysis directed
by this Court's precedents."); Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 4, Nitro-Lift Techs. LLC v.
Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (No. 11-1377) ("Because the Oklahoma court's decision
is irreconcilable with this Court's decisions in Prima Paint, Buckeye Check Cashing, and
Preston, Nitro-Lift respectfully requests that the Court . . . summarily reverse the
decision below . . . .").
50 Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 27, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011) (No. 10-
1521) (Carter Phillips and Sidley Austin LLP as counsel of record); Pet. for Writ of Cert.
at 31, Clarksburg Nursing Home & Rehab. Center, LLC v. Marchio, 132 S. Ct. 1619
(2011) (No. 11-394) (Andrew Pincus and Mayer Brown LLP as counsel of record).
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more comfort in issuing a summary reversal.51 The petitioners in two of the
recent cases were supported by one or more amici,52 which also appears to
increase the likelihood that the Court will grant review in a case. 53
Whatever the reason for the summary reversals (which I discuss more in
Part III), all of the lower court decisions involved nothing more than the
erroneous application of settled legal principles. In each of the cases, the
Court was engaged simply in error correction.
B. Argued Cases
With a handful of exceptions, the arbitration cases decided by the
Supreme Court after full briefing and oral argument have raised important
issues. One exception is Preston v. Ferrer.54 The issue in Preston was
whether the arbitrator or an administrative agency (initially anyway) must
decide whether a contract that included an arbitration clause was illegal.55
The Court, with only Justice Thomas dissenting (on the ground that the FAA
does not apply in state court), held that Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna "largely, if not entirely, resolves the dispute before us." 56 It
rejected respondent's attempts to distinguish Buckeye, finding no reason to
51 KEvIN T. McGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 182 (1993) ("[E]ven when a host of variables that might also
exercise some effect on certiorari are taken into account, experienced Supreme Court
representation stands out as an important predictor. Presumably, the Court places greater
trust in those judgments they know to be reliable.").
52 See Brief for Alabama Bankers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (No. 02-1295); Brief for Alabama
Pest Control Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (No. 02-1295) 2003 WL 21261778; Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Seventeenth Street Associates LLC as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Clarksburg Nursing Home & Rehab. Center, LLC v. Marchio,
132 S. Ct. 1619 (2011) (No. 11-394); Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae
and Brief of Beverly Enterprises-West Virginia, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Clarksburg Nursing Home & Rehab. Center, LLC v. Marchio, 132 S. Ct.
1619 (2011) (No. 11-394); Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief
for American Health Care Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Clarksburg
Nursing Home & Rehab. Center, LLC v. Marchio, 132 S. Ct. 1619 (2011) (No. 11-394).
53 McGUIRE, supra note 51, at 182 table 8.1.
54 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
55 Id. at 353.
56 Id. at 354.
14
[Vol.29:1 20141
ERROR CORRECTION
treat state agencies differently from state courts as in Buckeye. 57 The Court's
ruling on this issue is a very narrow one. Indeed, the Petition for Certiorari in
Preston did not cite any asserted conflict among the lower courts, instead
arguing principally that "[t]he reasoning of the Court of Appeal . . . sets a
precedent which can negate Buckeye and invalidate arbitration agreements
under state law merely by inserting an administrative proceeding ahead of a
decision by the Courts." 58 The decision has much more in common with the
summary reversals described above than the other argued cases in the Court's
docket.
Among those cases that raised important legal issues, most have done
more than simply correct errors. Of the eighteen arbitration cases decided
after argument from O.T. 2000 through the present, half decided what I see
as important arbitration law issues in ways that were not limited to their facts
(although several of those could have turned out to be much narrower
decisions, as discussed below). 59 Another couple of cases resolved circuit
splits on what I would call less significant issues, but ones that benefited
from their resolution. 60
That said, several argued arbitration cases involved narrow holdings that
have largely been limited to their facts. For example, in Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,61 the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff must introduce some evidence that arbitration costs precluded her
from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights. 62 But the Court
57 Id. at 355-60.
58 Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 6, Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 06-1463).
The more important issue addressed by the Court was how to construe the choice-of-law
clause in the contract, see infra text accompanying notes 68-74, but that issue was not
even mentioned in the cert petition.
59 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T
Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hall
Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002);
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
60 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009); C&L Enter. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
61 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
62 The case involved a preliminary issue of whether it was immediately appealable,
over which the circuits were divided. Id.at 87 n.3. The Supreme Court unanimously held
that it was. Id at 88.
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provided no guidance on what evidence would be sufficient-since the
plaintiff had introduced none 63-making the decision quite a narrow one.
More recently, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,
the Supreme Court vacated an arbitral award on the ground that the
arbitrators imposed their own policy preferences in concluding that an
arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. 64 The Supreme Court then went
on to hold that on the facts of the case the clause did not authorize class
arbitration, with the key fact being that the parties had stipulated that the
agreement was silent on class arbitration.65 In both respects, the decision is
remarkably narrow. Certainly a stipulation that a court construes as
conceding away the entire case is unusual. And the Court emphasized in
Stolt-Nielsen that the arbitrators had not made any attempt to construe the
language of the contract itself, suggesting that if they had done so the award
might be upheld. After Stolt-Nielsen, not surprisingly, arbitrators made sure
to focus on the contract language in making their awards,66 and the Court
subsequently upheld such an award in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter.67
After Sutter, Stolt-Nielsen has largely been limited to its facts.
Other decisions were initially applied broadly but eventually limited by
the Supreme Court. The best illustration of this is from before the time period
covered in Table 1, but it is still worth discussing because of its continuing
importance. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University, the Court held that the parties' choice-of-
law clause-as construed by the California Court of Appeal-incorporated
by reference a California arbitration statute providing for a stay of arbitration
pending resolution of a related dispute.68 As a result, even if the California
statute otherwise would have been preempted under Southland Corp. v.
63 Id at 92.
64 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 673-75 (2010).
65 Id at 686-687 & n.10 ("We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis
may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration. Here,
as noted, the parties stipulated that there was 'no agreement' on the issue of class-action
arbitration.").
66 Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ.
L. REv. 1103, 1154-58 (2011).
67 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013).
68 Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Board of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478-79 (1989). In addition to its timing, Volt also differs from the other cases discussed
here because it involved one of the vestiges of the Supreme Court's mandatory
jurisdiction (a vestige that no longer exists). Id. at 473 n.4; see Act of June 7, 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. As a result, at least in theory, the Court did not have the
same degree of discretion in deciding whether to review the case then as it would today.
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Keating, it was not preempted because the parties had made it part of their
arbitration agreement.
Volt quickly became an important way for courts to avoid FAA
preemption.69 Most contracts with arbitration clauses include choice-of-law
clauses as well. If that choice-of-law clause incorporates by reference a state
law alleged to be inconsistent with the FAA, the state law is "saved" from
preemption. It becomes instead a term of the parties' contract that the FAA
requires to be enforced.
In Volt, the Court deferred to the California Court of Appeal's
interpretation of the choice-of-law clause. 70 In Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., however, the Court adopted a different interpretation
from the California court in Volt.7 1 The Mastrobuono Court concluded that
the "best way to harmonize" the choice-of-law and arbitration clauses was to
interpret the choice-of-law clause "to encompass substantive principles that
New York courts would apply, but not to include [New York's] special rules
limiting the authority of arbitrators." 72 The Court reiterated that holding in
Preston v. Ferrer.73 Since then, most courts have followed the Supreme
Court's interpretation, and the use of a choice-of-law clause to evade FAA
preemption has declined substantially.74 Although Volt is often cited, its
importance as a practical matter has been much restrained.
The same is true of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.75 In Bazzle, a
plurality of the Court concluded that arbitrators, rather than courts, must
determine whether an arbitration clause permits class arbitration. 76 In
response to Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association adopted rules for
administering class arbitrations,77 and proceeded to administer over 350 class
69 See An Unnecessary Choice ofLaw: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration
Act Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2250,2260 (2002).
70 489 U.S. at 474-77.
71 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 n.4 (1995).
72 Id. at 63-64; see also id. at 59 (questioning whether to construe choice-of-law
clause also as "includ[ing] the caveat, 'detached from otherwise-applicable federal
law."').
73 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 362-63 (2008).
74 See, e.g., In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. 2010)
("Courts rarely read such general choice-of-law provisions to choose state law to the
exclusion of federal law.").
75 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
76 Id. at 451-52 (Breyer, J.).
7 7 American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
(Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/
document/dgdf/mdaO/-edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf.
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arbitrations under standards based in part on Bazzle.78 But in Stolt-Nielsen,
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court criticized such reliance
on Bazzle,79 and in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter the Court made clear
that who decides whether an arbitration clause authorizes class arbitration
remains an open question.80 Bazzle has been left with essentially no
remaining effect.
Finally, several other cases involve unusual facts so that the decisions
might have been limited in reach. But despite that possibility, subsequent
courts have applied them broadly. In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,
the Court held that arbitrators rather than courts must decide whether an
arbitration clause is unconscionable when the parties have delegated that
issue to the arbitrators.81 Rent-A-Center was unusual, however, in that it
contained a detailed delegation clause.82 Such clauses are rare, 83 and the
main reason Rent-A-Center has been applied so broadly is that courts have
treated institutional arbitration rules as including similarly broad delegation
provisions, 84 which is open to question.85 And as has often been pointed out,
the arbitration clause in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion contained an
incentive provision setting a minimum award of $7,500 (increased to
$10,000) if the arbitrator awarded more than AT&T's last settlement offer.86
78 Gregory A. Litt & Tina Praprotnik, After Stolt-Nielsen, Circuits Split, but AAA
Filings Continue, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., July 2012, at 27.
79 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770-72 (2010).
80 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013).
81 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
82 Id. at 2777.
83 Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1, 34-35 (2013).
84 See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp., A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir.
July 26, 2013) (UNCITRAL arbitration rules); Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott
Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (AAA arbitration rules).
8 5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 4-14, reporters' note to cmt. (e) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
86 AT&T Mobility actually filed a brief opposing certiorari in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v.
Laster, presenting the same issue as Concepcion, arguing as follows:
The coming wave of decisions addressing third-generation arbitration
provisions [like the one in AT&T Mobility's contract] could put the preemption
issue to rest without necessitating this Court's involvement by making clear that
these provisions are fully enforceable under state law. Alternatively, if one or more
federal courts of appeals holds that even third-generation arbitration provisions are
unenforceable under state law, the preemption issue will be much more sharply
presented. In that circumstance, it will be clear that state law categorically precludes
an enforceable consumer arbitration provision that requires individual arbitration,
18
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Again, such provisions are rare, 87 although they have become more common
after Concepcion.88 Lower courts might have limited Concepcion to its
unusual facts, although they have almost never done so.
Although certainly not all, at the very least a number of recent Supreme
Court arbitration decisions in argued cases either have been, or could have
been, largely limited to their facts. As such, and subject to the caveats noted
above, 89 those cases can be characterized as largely involving error
correction.
III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR ERROR CORRECTION IN SUPREME
COURT ARBITRATION CASES
Given the extent of error correction in Supreme Court arbitration cases,
the next question is, why? Why has the Court issued decisions in arbitration
cases that are largely limited to their facts, doing little more than correcting
errors?
I offer three possible explanations. First, in the summary reversals as
well as some of the narrow decisions in argued cases, the Court is responding
to lower court resistance to its arbitration decisions, essentially keeping those
courts in line. Second, and more generally, many of the Supreme Court cases
discussed above involve legal standards rather than legal rules. The nature of
standards (which require individualized determinations on the facts of the
case), combined with the incentives of parties seeking Supreme Court
review, can lead to narrow decisions largely limited to their facts. Third,
because of nuances of arbitration law, the Court has granted review in "poor"
cases-cases that do not present well, if at all, the issue it is trying to decide.
and the question for the Court will be whether the FAA preempts states from
imposing a de facto across-the-board ban on consumer arbitration provisions that
require individual arbitration.
Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 21-22, T-
Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976); see T-Mobile USA, Inc.
v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (denying certiorari).
87 Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 83, at 36-37.
88 Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining "Consumer-Friendly"
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 825,
857-59 (2012).
89 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
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A. Lower Court Resistance to Supreme Court Arbitration Doctrine
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretations of the FAA have been
unpopular in some quarters, to say the least. Much of the criticism is directed
at the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, in which it held that
the FAA applies in state court and preempts conflicting state law. 90 Justice
O'Connor (in dissent in Southland itself91) and Justices Thomas and Scalia
(in dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson92) have strongly
criticized the decision. Indeed, Justice Thomas continues to dissent from
opinions in argued cases that apply the FAA in state court,93 and Justice
Scalia has indicated his willingness to overrule Southland if enough members
of the Court agree to do so.94
Lower courts have not only expressed disagreement with the Supreme
Court's decisions, they have affirmatively sought to evade those decisions
through creative and sometimes strained interpretations of the FAA. 95
Perhaps the best-known expression of disagreement is a concurring opinion
by Justice Terry Trieweiler of the Montana Supreme Court in a decision later
vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the
appellate level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of
congressional intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to
their naive assumption that arbitration provisions and choice of law
provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of [the State of Montana's]
procedural safeguards and substantive laws are easily avoided by any party
with enough leverage to stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in
its pre-printed contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power
to sign it.
90 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984).
91 Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
94 Allied Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 A possible rationale comes from often-reversed Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, who is reputed to have said, in response to Supreme Court reversals of his
decisions, that "[t]hey can't catch 'em all." See Matt Rees, The Judge the Supreme Court
Loves to Overturn, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (May 5, 1997), http://www.theweekly
standard. com/content/public/articles/000/000/001/414ilyss.asp.
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Nothing in our jurisprudence appears more intellectually detached from
reality and arrogant than the lament of federal judges who see this system of
imposed arbitration as "therapy for their crowded dockets." These decisions
have perverted the purpose of the FAA from one to accomplish judicial
neutrality, to one of open hostility to any legislative effort to assure that
unsophisticated parties to contracts of adhesion at least understand the
rights they are giving up.
It seems to me that judges who have let their concern for their own
crowded docket overcome their concern for the rights they are entrusted
with should step aside and let someone else assume their burdens. The last I
checked, there were plenty of capable people willing to do so.96
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' opinion in Marmet
Health, described above, is another illustration of a court not just disagreeing
with the Supreme Court's FAA preemption cases, but saying bluntly that it
disagrees and acting accordingly. 97
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl has explained how courts used unconscionability
doctrine to evade the Supreme Court's FAA preemption decisions (at least
until reined in to some degree by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion).9 8 He
emphasized that "[t]he flexibility of unconscionability doctrine ... creates
the potential for the conflicting judicial preferences to express themselves
through manipulation of state law,"99 and cited state court judges explaining
96 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J.,
concurring), vacated sub nom.; Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
97 Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278-79 (W. Va. 2011),
rev'd sub nom.; Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per
curiam); see supra text accompanying note 42. For other examples, see, e.g., Feeney v.
Dell Inc., 993 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 2013) ("Although we regard as untenable the
Supreme Court's view that 'the FAA's command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims,' we are bound to accept that
view as a controlling statement of Federal law."); Selma Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Fontenot, 824
So. 2d 668, 681 (Ala. 2001) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) ("Because Congress wrote and
enacted the FAA as a procedural device and intended that it apply exclusively in federal
courts, it has no application to the case before us-a case between Alabama residents and
Alabama corporations, based on state-law claims, for which exclusive jurisdiction lies in
a court of the State of Alabama."); Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 504
(Mo. 2012) (Price, J., dissenting) ("The majority's newly created right to an attorney for
consumer claims morphs into a right to class arbitration proceedings, and then morphs
into a right to void individual arbitration agreements altogether. While this is certainly
clever lawyering, it is not the law and it openly flaunts the FAA and Concepcion.").
98 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
99 Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution ofFederal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1488 (2008).
21
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
how they will "write their way around the FAA" if need be. 00 Of course,
state court resistance to FAA preemption predates their use of
unconscionability doctrine, as Professor Bruhl recognizes.' 0' As discussed
above, courts also have sought to avoid FAA preemption by construing the
scope of the FAA narrowly 02 and by construing choice-of-law clauses to
incorporate by reference state laws that might otherwise be preempted.103
The continued resistance of some state courts to the Supreme Court's
arbitration doctrine explains a number of the Court's "error correction"
decisions. The decisions do involve error correction, but with the purpose of
keeping lower courts in line in the face of such resistance.104 All of the
summary reversals in arbitration cases (with the possible exception of KPMG
v. Cocchi) reflect clear evidence of state court resistance to the Supreme
Court's FAA preemption decisions. 05 Preston v. Ferrer might also be
viewed in that light, 106 following as it did on the heels of Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.107 Occasional federal court cases also might be
100 Id. at 1456 n.136 (quoting POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE PRIVATIZATION
OF JUSTICE? MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE STATE COURTS: REPORT OF THE 2003
FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES 119, 123 (2006)).
101 Id. at 1430-31 (citing Allied-Bruce and Alafabco).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 43-45; see also Bruhl, supra note 99, at
1430-31.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
104 For an illustration in another subject area see Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7-8
(2011) (per curiam) ("The decision below cannot be allowed to stand. This Court vacated
and remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel's attention to this Court's
opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state courts in § 2254(d) habeas cases.
Each time the panel persisted in its course, reinstating its judgment without seriously
confronting the significance of the cases called to its attention. Its refusal to do so
necessitates this Court's action today.") (citations omitted); see also Kirshbaum, supra
note 35, at 2 ("The idea behind these so-called summary reversals is to correct especially
egregious errors or to chasten a lower court that may be deliberately flouting or ignoring
the [C]ourt's precedent."); Orin Kerr, Youngblood, Young Blood, and the Supreme
Court's Role in the Criminal Justice System, ORINKERR.COM (June 20, 2006) (copy on
file with author) ("My own pet theory is that Chief Justice Roberts thinks that some lower
courts are being sloppy in criminal cases: He wants to pressure them to be more careful
by sending a signal that the Supreme Court is watching.").
105 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
106 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); see Bruhl supra note 99, at 1469 (stating
that Preston v. Ferrer "did not appear to be very important in terms of having a broad
impact and was in that sense a poor candidate for certiorari. But it presented a readily
manageable question of preemption, and in that way it was attractive.").
107 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); see
supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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seen as involving resistance to Supreme Court arbitration doctrine, such as
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.108 The resistance there was from the
Ninth Circuit, which was the only circuit to hold that the Credit Repair
Organizations Act precluded enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements before being reversed by an almost-unanimous Supreme
Court.109
Overall, then, one explanation for error correction in Supreme Court
arbitration decisions is that it is necessary to discipline lower courts that
otherwise might not adhere to settled Supreme Court doctrine.
B. Rules Versus Standards: "Easy Cases Make No Law"
The Supreme Court's arbitration cases involve a mix of rules and
standards. The distinction between the two is defined in the law and
economics literature as follows:
Rules are those legal commands which differentiate legal from illegal
behavior in a simple and clear way. Standards, however, are general legal
criteria which are unclear and fuzzy and require complicated judiciary
decision making. A speed limit whose violation leads to a fine of 100$ is a
rule, whereas a norm for car drivers to "drive carefully" whose violation
leads to damage compensation is a standard. In the latter case the legal
norm leaves open what exactly the level of due care is and how the damage
compensation is to be calculated.1 10
108 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). The resistance in
CompuCredit was not to the Court's FAA preemption cases, but rather to its cases
holding that federal statutory claims were arbitrable.
109 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd,
132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). Justice Ginsberg was the only dissenter. 132 S. Ct. at 676
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Court Rebukes Ninth
Circuit (Again) in Reaffirming Arbitration Agreements, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Jan. 11,
2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=136587 ("So the real question, then, is whether
there is anything more interesting in Greenwood than a factbound application of settled
Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA') jurisprudence to rein in a disloyal court of appeals.
Perhaps.").
110 Hans-Bemd Schaefer, Legal Rules and Standards, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 347, 347 (Charles Rowley & Friedrich Schneider, eds., 2003) (citations
omitted); Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner,
J.) ("A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal
liability; a standard permits consideration of all or at least most facts that are relevant to
the standard's rationale. A speed limit is a rule; negligence is a standard."); see Frank
Cross et al., A Positive Political Theory of Rules and Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 1
(2012); Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A New Angle on Rules versus
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In the arbitration context, a decision construing federal law to permit
arbitration of a certain statutory claim (or not, as the case may be) or holding
that the arbitrator (or the court) is to decide a certain challenge to the
arbitration clause establishes a rule. Examples of cases establishing rules
include CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, II Hall Street Associates, LLC v.
Mattel, Inc.,1l2 Vaden v. Discover Bank,113 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna,1 4 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,1 5 and Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams.116 By comparison, a decision holding that an arbitration
agreement is enforceable on the facts of the case-such as that it does not
preclude the claimant from vindicating his or her federal statutory
rights-establishes and applies a standard. Cases like Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,117 Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 18
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,'1 9 AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion,120 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurantl21 all establish, or might be construed as establishing, standards
rather than rules.122
Standards, (Jan. 23, 2012), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1990592;
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985).
111 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). Of course, at a
broader level of generality, CompuCredit might be seen as involving application of a
standard (how a court determines whether Congress intended to preclude arbitration of a
statutory claim) rather than a rule. My focus, however, is on how future parties will seek
to have courts apply the decision, and from that perspective the outcome of the decision
is a rule that claims under the Credit Repair Organizations Act are arbitrable.
112 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
113 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009).
114 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
115 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
116 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
117 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
118 Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
119 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
120 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
121 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
122 I say "might be construed as involving standards" because a very narrow
application of a standard might instead be construed as establishing a rule that certain
behavior never satisfies the standard. For example, the issue in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant was whether a class arbitration waiver precluded the plaintiffs
from vindicating their statutory rights under the federal antitrust laws because the case
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Scholars have identified a variety of implications of the choice between
rules and standards.123 I discuss an additional implication of the choice of a
standard here: that the breadth of a court decision applying a standard varies
depending on how strong the case is on its facts (i.e., where the case falls in
the distribution of similar cases) and the outcome of the case. If the case is a
strong one on its facts, and the court rules that the strong case satisfies the
standard, the decision can turn out to be a very narrow one. If the case had
come out the other way, however, the decision would have been a very broad
one.
Consider the following illustration. Assume that a court is deciding
whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable in the face of a challenge
that it precludes the claimant from effectively vindicating his or her federal
statutory rights.124 Some cases present strong facts for enforcing the
arbitration agreement-i.e., for rejecting the effective vindication challenge.
Other cases present weak facts for enforcing the arbitration agreement-i.e.,
for accepting the effective vindication challenge.125 Figure 1 depicts the
was not economical to pursue other than on a class basis. Id. at 2308. The lower courts
considered evidence on how much it would cost to litigate the case and whether there
were alternative ways of pursuing the case other than as a class action. Even at oral
argument in the Supreme Court, the Justices asked numerous questions about the factual
viability of the plaintiffs' claim. On that view, the case involved the application of a
standard to the facts of the case.
That said, Justice Scalia in particular asked questions at oral argument suggesting
that the effective vindication doctrine is not available to challenge the enforceability of an
arbitration clause. If the defense is altogether unavailable, the Court has adopted a legal
rule rather than a legal standard. And the Court ultimately held that the unavailability of
class relief does not preclude a claimant from effectively vindicating its rights under a
federal statute enacted prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-arguably a rules-based rather than standards-based approach. Id. at 2310-11.
123 E.g., Schaefer, supra note 110, at 347-50; see also Bruhl, supra note 99, at
1474-77 (arguing that the Supreme Court addresses the "who decides" issue to avoid
complicated factual and legal issues under the savings clause of FAA Section 2).
124 The Court in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant seemed to
accept, albeit only in dicta, that under some circumstances an arbitration agreement might
be unenforceable under an "effective vindication" theory. Id. at 2310-11.
125 Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting):
Consider several alternatives that a party drafting an arbitration agreement
could adopt to avoid antitrust liability, each of which would have the identical
effect. On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish
an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from
gaining access to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove
the arbitrator's authority to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the
claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might block the
claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to establish the
25
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distribution of cases as a bell curve-that is, it assumes that the cases are
normally distributed.126 The parties obviously have an incentive to present
the strongest possible case for their respective positions to the court.
Moreover, if the court (such as the Supreme Court) has control over its
docket, it may be more likely to decide to hear cases in the tails of the
distribution (either very weak or very strong cases, as indicated in Figure
1).127
Under principles of stare decisis, the court's decision to enforce or not to
enforce an arbitration agreement in a particular case provides information
about the likely outcome of future cases. If a court enforces an arbitration
agreement, we know that arbitration agreements in cases with facts stronger
than those in the decided case are also likely to be enforced. But we do not
know for sure how cases with facts weaker than the decided case are likely to
come out. The facts in those cases may not be strong enough to satisfy the
standard. Conversely, if a court refuses to enforce an arbitration agreement,
we know that arbitration agreements in cases with facts weaker than those in
the decided case also are likely not to be enforced. Again, we do not know
for sure how cases stronger than the decided case are likely to come out.
defendant's liability-say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck
proving an antitrust claim without that!).
126 The point in the text holds for other distributions, but the bell curve makes the
point more plainly.
127 Given the uncertainty over the application of a standard in cases likely to make it
to the Supreme Court (or perhaps the applicable standard itself), one would not
necessarily expect to see the parties settle the extreme cases.
26
[Vol.29:1 2014]
ERROR CORRECTION
Strong case Weak case
for for enforcing
enforcing agreement
agreement
I I
I I
I I
I I
Figure 1. Normal Distribution of Case Strengths
As such, the strength of a case can have significant implications for how
broad a ruling the court issues. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this point. If the
decided case has very strong facts for enforcement, as in Figure 2, a decision
enforcing the agreement actually provides information about very few
cases-only those cases in the far left part of the distribution, in which we
now know the arbitration agreement is enforceable. Indeed, at the extreme, if
the facts of the decided case are sufficiently strong, the decision may provide
no information about other cases (which have weaker facts). In other words,
"easy cases make no law." 128 By comparison, if the court refuses to enforce
the arbitration clause in such a case, we know how all cases with facts
weaker than those in the decided case are likely to come out. If the decided
case has particularly strong facts-i.e., is in the far left tail of the
distribution-that means we now know how a large number of cases should
come out, as illustrated in Figure 3.
128 George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 941, 960 n.76 (1992) ("[T]he aphorism 'hard cases make bad law'
makes little sense. The aphorism should be 'easy cases make no law."' (citation
omitted)).
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Stated otherwise, a case that is a narrow decision based on unusual facts
could, in fact, have been a very broad decision had it come out the other way.
Take, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.129 As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit in
Green Tree held that the risk of incurring high arbitration costs alone, even in
the absence of any evidence of the actual costs of arbitration, was enough to
invalidate the arbitration clause.1 30 On its facts, that is a very weak case for
invalidating the arbitration clause (and hence a very strong case for enforcing
the clause) and a very strong case for reversing the Eleventh Circuit. It is a
case far to the left in the tail of the distribution in Figure 1.
If the Supreme Court had affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the
Court's decision would have been a broad one. It would have resolved a
large number of other cases because the risk of high costs, without regard to
the evidence that costs precluded the claimant from actually bringing his or
her claim, would have been sufficient to invalidate an arbitration clause. 131
Under that hypothetical decision, all the cases with stronger evidence of high
arbitration costs likewise should result in the invalidation of the agreement.
Such an outcome is shown in Figure 3-indeed, it may be even more
extreme than Figure 3 because the facts for refusing to enforce the agreement
were extremely weak. But instead the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit,
holding that an absence of evidence alone is insufficient. Since in most cases
raising this issue the plaintiff can provide at least some evidence of high
arbitration costs, the decision in Green Tree-as it came out-actually was
very narrow.
Several of the "error correction" cases described above appear to be
cases involving the application of standards to very one-sided facts: Green
Tree and Stolt-Nielsen 32 are the best examples. Amex, Concepcion, and
Rent-A-Center likewise are all cases with unusual facts (discussed further
below133) that might have resulted in narrow decisions under legal standards.
Such narrow decisions involve error correction as I define it here, but would
have been much broader decisions (going well beyond error correction) had
they come out the other way.
129 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
131 Alternatively, the decision might have been characterized as adopting a rule
rather than one applying a standard. See supra note 122.
132 Given the Supreme Court's interpretation of the stipulation at issue in Stolt-
Nielsen, it likewise was a very weak case on the merits. See supra text accompanying
notes 64-65.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
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C. The Selection of (Poor) Cases for Review
A third reason for the prevalence of error correction in Supreme Court
arbitration cases is that the Court too often has chosen poor cases to review.
Mistakes in selecting cases happen, even given the strong bias against
granting review. But arbitration law is sufficiently technical that generalists
like Supreme Court justices (and their clerks) may not, at the certiorari stage,
appreciate how various arbitration doctrines will affect the ultimate outcome
of the case. 134 As a result, the Court grants cases that it should not grant,
which results in narrow, "error correction" decisions.
The Court's "class arbitration trilogy"-Bazzle,135 Stolt-Nielsen,136 and
Sutterl 37-highlights a number of the complications involved in selecting an
arbitration case that is a "proper vehicle" for Court review. The question
presented in the cert petition in Bazzle was "[w]hether the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., prohibits class-action procedures from being
superimposed onto an arbitration agreement that does not provide for class-
action arbitration."138 But because the case itself was from a state court, an
initial question was whether the FAA even applied. Justice Thomas dissented
from the decision in Bazzle on the ground that the FAA did not apply,139
although the rest of the Justices duly followed Southland. Because of Justice
Thomas's views, only eight Justices will reach the merits when the Court
reviews an FAA case from a state court, creating a greater potential for split
decisions (as happened in Bazzle). 140
134 For even harsher criticisms of the Court's tax decisions see Staudt supra note 33,
at 890-91.
135 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
136 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
137 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
138 Pet. for Writ of Cert. at i, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003)
(No. 02-634).
139 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 447 (Breyer, J.). The Court seems to have figured this out. Aside from
summary reversals, the only state court arbitration cases it has taken since Bazzle are
Buckeye Check Cashing and Preston v. Ferrer, both of which were unanimous (except
for Justice Thomas). See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449
(2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The Court's most controversial recent arbitration cases all were from federal
courts, and Justice Thomas fully participated (e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011)).
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Second, even if the FAA applies, it might apply differently in state court
than in federal court. By their terms, most provisions of the FAA apply only
in federal court, 14 1 as the Supreme Court has acknowledged (although not yet
held).142 Only FAA section 2, which makes arbitration agreements "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable," 43 has been held to apply in state court,144 and
the Supreme Court's FAA preemption cases all involve FAA section 2. The
FAA surely does constrain (to some degree) state laws that address other
parts of the arbitration process, such as the enforcement of awards.145 But the
analysis and outcome may be different in state court than in federal court.146
Third, a preliminary question to almost all issues of arbitration law is
who decides that issue, the court or the arbitrator. So in Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, for example, the Supreme Court held that the
arbitrator, rather than a court is to decide whether a contract with an
arbitration clause is illegal. 147 Accordingly, in Bazzle, the plurality ultimately
concluded that the arbitrator and not a court needed to decide whether the
141 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § §3, 4, 9, 10 (2012).
142 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 71 n.20 (2009) ("This Court has not
decided whether §§ 3 and 4 apply to proceedings in state courts, and we do not do so
here.") (internal citation omitted); Volt Info. Scis. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) ("While we have held that the FAA's 'substantive'
provisions-§§ 1 and 2-are applicable in state as well as federal court, we have never
held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal
court, are nonetheless applicable in state court.") (internal citations omitted); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984) ("In holding that the Arbitration Act
preempts a state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements, we do
not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts.
Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in
proceedings to compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not apply in such state-court
proceedings.").
143 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
144 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 20.
145 For example, a state law that makes all arbitration awards non-binding would
surely be preempted as inconsistent with FAA section 2.
146 If Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. had come from a state court instead
of the Ninth Circuit, for example, it might have come out differently. See Christopher R.
Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 906, 922-26
(2010).
147 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-49 (2006); see
also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.148 As a result, the plurality
never even reached the question on which cert had been granted.149
Finally, even if the Court wants to address the "who decides" question, it
can only do so if the parties have not already resolved that issue themselves.
If the parties have agreed to have the arbitrator (or the court) decide the
question, then that is who makes the decision. This reality caused problems
for the Court in both Stolt-Nielsen and Sutter. Both cases appeared to be
follow-ups to Bazzle, such that the Court might finally resolve the question of
who decides whether an arbitration clause authorizes class arbitration. But in
both cases, the parties had agreed after the dispute arose to have the arbitrator
decide the question, leaving the Court reviewing the award under FAA
section 10 rather than resolving the "who decides" issue. 15 0
Other potential complications come from unusual facts in the cases
themselves (what Suja Thomas would call "atypical" cases 51). As discussed
above, both Concepcion and Rent-A-Center involved unusual arbitration
clauses-Concepcion because it included an incentive provision and Rent-A-
Center because of the unusually precise delegation clause.152 Stolt-Nielsen,
Amex, and Sutter were unusual in another way-they all involved business-
to-business arbitrations in cases raising issues that usually arise in business-
to-consumer disputes.153 Only Stolt-Nielsen has been largely limited to its
facts, but the other cases all could have had much more limited reach than
they did. 154
148 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).
149 For another example see PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401,
405-07 (2003) (not deciding whether contractual punitive damages limitation prevented
plaintiff from "obtaining 'meaningful relief'" in arbitration; instead holding that deciding
whether punitive damages limitation covered treble damages was preliminary issue that
must be decided by the arbitrator).
150 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013) ("But
this case gives us no opportunity to do so because Oxford agreed that the arbitrator
should determine whether its contract with Sutter authorized class procedures."); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 680 (2010) ("But we need not
revisit that question here because the parties' supplemental agreement expressly assigned
this issue to the arbitration panel . . . .").
151 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
153 Sutter, 133 S. Ct. at 2067 (dispute between physicians and health insurance
company); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013)
(dispute between credit card company and merchants); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 667
(dispute between shipping company and merchant customers).
154 Bales and Gerano argued that "the Supreme Court has chosen for its arbitration
docket a set of cases with wholly atypical fact patterns in what appears to be a deliberate
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the axiom that that the "Supreme Court is not a court of error
correction," a number of the Court's arbitration cases are narrow decisions
that do little more than correct errors by lower courts. I offer three
explanations for these types of decisions, each of which explains some of the
cases: (1) the Court is responding to resistance by lower courts to its FAA
arbitration doctrine; (2) cases involving the application of legal standards to
one-sided facts can result in narrow decisions; and (3) the Court has chosen
some poor cases for review.
To address the latter explanation, I conclude with a few suggestions for
how the Court might improve its choice of arbitration cases for review.
Another way of viewing these suggestions is not as directed to the Court but
rather as directed to counsel-as questions to consider in seeking or opposing
certiorari before the Court:
* Avoid cases from state courts when federal court cases present the
same issue. The unsettled scope of FAA preemption in state court (and
Justice Thomas's persistence in his view that the FAA does not apply at all in
state court) make it more straightforward to resolve arbitration issues in
federal court cases, if possible.
* Avoid cases arising out of post-dispute arbitration clauses. As
illustrated by Stolt-Nielsen and Sutter, the presence of a post-dispute
arbitration agreement can change the legal analysis and prevent the Court
from addressing the issue it might otherwise want to address.
* Avoid cases with atypical rather than typical arbitration clauses.
Cases with atypical clauses increase the risk of a narrow decision by the
Court and the resulting greater uncertainty as to how the decision applies to
future cases.
* Avoid business-to-business cases that address issues arising most
often in consumer or employment cases-again, to reduce the uncertainty
resulting from atypical facts.
effort-successful so far-to advance its pro-arbitration policy agenda without provoking
a political backlash." Bales & Gerano, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4). They argue, for
example, that in Concepcion, "[b]y using a very pro-consumer arbitration agreement to
destroy the unconscionability defense, the Court was able to provide a smokescreen to its
anti-consumer ruling." Id. (manuscript at 34). Perhaps that is the Court's motivation. But
it certainly is not the case that the Court's "smokescreen" somehow protected its decision
in Concepcion from public scrutiny. The decision has been highly controversial despite
the atypical facts, as has been the decision in Amex.
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